

AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

RETHINKING THE OPERATIONAL RESERVE

by

Brian M. Howlett, LtCol, USMC

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Biography

LtCol Howlett is a student at the Air War College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL. Born in Huntington, New York and commissioned a Second Lieutenant in 1993. LtCol Howlett received a BS in History from Jacksonville University, an MA in Management from Troy University, and an MS in Military Science from Marine Corps University. LtCol Howlett is a Marine Infantry Officer who has served in Infantry and Amphibious Reconnaissance units in all four Marine Divisions during numerous overseas deployments, including combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan. He is an honor graduate of the US Army Field Artillery Captain's Career Course, Marine Aviation and Weapons Tactics Instructor Course, and distinguished graduate of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College.



Abstract

The various service Reserve Components have been a critical part of the Total Force for several decades. Although great efforts were undertaken to “operationalize” the Reserve Component over the last few years, future requirements will likely not justify a fully manned, trained, and equipped operational reserve. The Department of Defense will not likely be able to simultaneously afford both a robust active component and an operational reserve; expected shortfalls require a change in how the reserves are structured and utilized. With the expected reduction of American presence abroad, and likely economic austerity for the military, the United States must rethink the missions, requirements, and readiness of the reserve components.

If elements of the reserve component operated at lower levels of readiness and training, significant costs could be saved. Potential deployment options for the reserves must be predictive, should best leverage existing reserve capabilities, and should accurately assess costs for equipment and resources. Options to save costs include reducing reserve training days, exploring creative solutions to equipment shortfalls, and better assessing training requirements for reserve units. Although it will involve certain risks, the Department of Defense must review and transform the policies and options in which reserve units are trained, equipped, and employed.



Introduction

The reserve components of the United State (US) military have been essential to the conduct of war since 2001. The Total Force would not have been successful in overseas contingencies without the significant contributions made by the National Guard and Reserves. However, as forces retrograded from Iraq at the end of 2011, and the commitment to Afghanistan is not open ended, what will be the requirements of the total force in the near future? With the expected reduction of US presence abroad, and looming economic austerity for the military, the Department of Defense (DoD) must reevaluate the missions, requirements, and readiness of the reserve components. It can be assumed that the US will not continue to deploy units with the frequency that it has since 2001. Although great efforts were undertaken to “operationalize” the Reserve Component (RC) over the last few years, the environment in the near term might not require an operational reserve. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta issued strategic guidance for the service in January 2012, which indicated that the future force will be “smaller and leaner, but will be agile, flexible, ready, and technologically advanced.”¹ The various service Force Generation (FORGEN) models have been the driving force behind deployments for the active component; the status of a reserve unit should shift from an operational status to a strategic status if it is not specifically tasked on a service FORGEN model. This status change will ultimately help distribute funding and allocate critical resources. Although this concept involves strategic risks, the US must change the construct of the RC to meet future challenges.

The Challenges of the Reserves

The National Guard and Reserve has been a valuable part of national defense since World War II. The RC consists of seven separate organizations within the military, including the Army National Guard, Air National Guard, Army Reserve, Air Force Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine

Corps Reserve, and Coast Guard Reserve; these forces total over 1 million service members, or almost half of total US manpower available.² Utilized in World War II, Korea, and numerous other operations, the RC has filled the gaps in the Active Component (AC) and provided strategic depth. Approximately 400,000 Guard and Reserve personnel supported World War II, and over 1 million mobilized for service in the Korean theater.³ However, its utilization has not always been efficient; in Korea, manpower shortfalls forced the Army to sacrifice air defense and other strategic capabilities to compensate for shortfalls in expeditionary and operational forces.⁴ During Vietnam, only 38,000 reservists were mobilized, which prompted General Creighton Abrams to question the validity of any major conflict that did not have the “will and spirit of American people” behind it.⁵ This valuable lesson from Vietnam eventually led to the AC and RC both being viewed together as a Total Force and would change future employment.

The RC first became “operationalized” after the 1991 Gulf War. Activated at a rate 140 percent greater than during the Cold War, the RC supported operations in Haiti, Kosovo, Bosnia, and elsewhere due to AC downsizing.⁶ They have been employed frequently since 2001 in a far greater capacity than ever conceived; the utilization of Guard and Reserve forces was greatest in 2005, and was the equivalent in cost to more than 186,000 personnel on duty for the entire year.⁷ This major shift in deployment from a strategic to operational reserve broke the paradigm of the reserves as an augmentation and reinforcement pool which would only be mobilized once during a 20-year career.⁸ The future of the RC is not certain; although utilized as an operational reserve over the last decade, it has been expensive to do so, will continue to be expensive, and has left the nation without a viable strategic reserve.

As deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan conclude, it is uncertain what future operational requirements will be. However, it can be assumed that there will not be large scale combat

operations in the near future, and it is certain that the DoD budget will decrease. Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) events (see figure 1) are likely deployment possibility versus high intensity combat operations in the near future. The AC might not be able to manage or fulfill all of the TSC requirements and other “phase zero” operations in the future and the RC, with its various civilian oriented skills, might be well suited to support efforts such as these.

Name	Location	Purpose
AFRICAN LION	Morocco	Build cooperative relationships and partner nation capacity through humanitarian outreach, operational exchanges, and tactical/logistical support.
BRIGHT STAR	Egypt	Joint, combined, multifaceted exercise focused on military themes, regional security cooperation and shared mutual security interest.
WESTERN ACCORD	Senegal/Nigeria	Small unit infantry procedures, staff training, and humanitarian assistance.
SHARED HORIZONS	Georgia	Multinational military and interagency exercise that assesses and improves national and regional disaster response and consequence management capabilities
NEW HORIZONS	Belize, Costa Rica, Ecuador	Joint and Combined Field training exercise focusing on engineering and/or medical humanitarian assistance.
TRADEWINDS	Southern Caribbean	Joint/combined maritime and ground exercise to prepare the region for transnational threats, sovereignty protection, and disaster relief.”
UNITAS LANT/PAC	South America	Regionally focused multi-phase, multinational, at sea naval security cooperation training exercise.

Figure 1. Example TSC Exercises

Without significant and imminent threats, the DoD will not be able to simultaneously afford both a robust AC and an operational reserve; expected shortfalls require a change in this construct. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) specified that that an operational reserve was “likely” needed for the future, pointing out specific elements of the RC with “high demand skill sets” would be needed to fulfill shortfalls.⁹ The QDR continues to identify that success in today’s wars “requires a reserve component that *can* serve in an operational capacity;” this does not mean that the entire reserve component needs to be operational at all times.¹⁰ However, it does mean that a portion of the RC might be required to fulfill an operational role.

There are numerous challenges and benefits associated with the RC. The RC costs less to maintain per year compared to the AC, but the cost savings might not be significant unless the

units are utilized. There are no significant cost savings of a reserve unit versus an active unit when mobilized. Many RC units have significant cohesion from operating together for long periods of time. Additionally, many RC units have gained unique skills via their participation in Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) and other noncombat operations.¹¹ However, the RC has been historically manned, trained, and equipped at lower levels compared to active units. Although there should be similar capabilities and readiness across the Total Force, the tiered system of readiness had been lowest in the RC for decades; only those units preparing to deploy were given adequate resources.¹² Lastly, AC forces are already “paid for;” the DoD does not have flexibility with their status. It is the RC that has potential flexibility and can offer the DoD capacity and capability at a reduced cost.

The main benefit of the reserve component is the strategic depth and flexibility compared to the relative cost. Since RC units do not operate full time, and since future requirements are not certain, the RC will likely need to periodically transition between operational and strategic roles to meet future challenges. Additionally, and unlike the last decade, the RC needs to be employed in a predictable manner for specific functions so the force is not overused; doing so has sacrificed some of its value and strategic depth.¹³ The DoD must establish and promulgate a method to deploy reserve forces in a predictive and methodical manner; it cannot afford to maintain the entire reserve component at its current level of readiness. The 2008 Commission on the Guard and Reserve recommended that the RC be reorganized into two categories, the Operational Reserve Force and Strategic Reserve Force. As defined in the recommendation, the main difference between these two forces is whether or not a unit is scheduled for an active duty tour.¹⁴ A review of deployment scheduling is necessary to best determine assets needed to meet operational requirements, and if any efficiencies could be gained.

The FORGEN Model and Employment

The FORGEN process determines and promulgates the requirements for the Total Force. Implemented in its current form in 2006, FORGEN models “provide long term and essential predictability of future activations and deployments for reservists.”¹⁵ Each of the services utilized some form of “rotational model” to add structure and predictability to units to meet combatant commander requirements.¹⁶ The goal is to provide two periods of reset and training per deployment period for the AC, and five periods for reset and training for the RC. This “dwell ratio” construct gives the force enough balance and recovery time for planned or anticipated requirements. As requirements for Iraq and Afghanistan continue to decrease, an assumption is that the Total Force will not deploy units with the same frequency as they have since 2001. If a unit is not designated for deployment on a FORGEN model, it serves as a reserve. It is the mission and readiness status of a unit that ultimately indicates if it is strategic or operational; forces deployed in support of the Combatant Commander or scheduled to do so are operational, and all others should be considered strategic. This applies to both the active and reserve forces.¹⁷

Recently the concept of a reserve has been problematic. The US military has not maintained a capable reserve in either Iraq or Afghanistan; all forces allocated have been committed to operations. Even the Iraq “surge” in 2007 was created by extending tours of units already in theater, or by sending other units scheduled to deploy ahead of their deployment date.¹⁸ At the strategic level, the only force resembling a strategic reserve is the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). These approximately 300,000 service members in the IRR, most of them serving out the remainder of an active service contract, have not been used in significant numbers and should not be considered for operational tasking to support future requirements.¹⁹ They

essentially serve as a trained contingency force, but would likely need substantial re-training time to return to full readiness. The United States cannot afford excess reserve capacity.

If a reserve unit is not listed for employment on the FORGEN model, it is not cost effective to continue to train, man, and equip them at the same levels as either active component units, or those preparing to deploy. A unit not scheduled to deploy within a certain period of time should shift in status posture from operational to strategic. During the Cold War, units followed a “mobilize-train-deploy” model; based on strategic levels of readiness, a reserve unit under this construct would require a fairly lengthy period after mobilization to improve readiness. However, since 2001, reserve units have adopted a “train-mobilize-deploy” model to meet demand. The US Army has attempted to utilize a 6-year forecasting methodology to meet future needs; those units scheduled to deploy in three years or less are given additional resources and training opportunities.²⁰ This concept has allowed for short periods of predeployment training, but has also resulted in more training days and resources needed prior to mobilization, and also meant that reserve units needed to be manned, trained, and equipped at similar levels compared to active units.²¹ The current Army readiness levels of “Reset/Train - Ready - Available” could potentially be adopted as a better description of readiness tied specifically to FORGEN. Strategic level units could potentially spend longer periods of time at the “Reset/Train” level, which could result in significant resource savings. A point to note: the FORGEN model only applies to units and larger detachments. Specific readiness issues concerning smaller detachments and individual augments are outside the scope of this research and require different handling due to the way they are utilized.

Reserve units have unique civilian related skills and experience. RC units with unique capabilities should be utilized as “First Choice” units in the FORGEN model for appropriate

missions; doing so would allow RC to be more predictive, and potentially allow AC units to support unanticipated contingencies. Also, if planned well in advance, the RC could specifically tailor training and provide additional skills resident in its civilian occupational skills potentially better than an AC unit. RC units need predictability and as much lead time as possible to be used effectively; other considerations are potential habitual relationships and regional expertise specific to RC units. Based on their civilian skills, RC units should be looked at as primary forces for enduring TSC and other partner missions.²²

The National Guard has additional responsibilities versus other reserve units. Guard units have specific US Code Title 32 responsibilities to state requirements and plans. During 2010, approximately 3,500 ARNG soldiers were mobilized in support of domestic requirements, to include the Deepwater Horizon oil spill cleanup, border security, flood relief operations, and similar missions.²³ Although the DoD has made efforts to better provide support to the Department of Homeland Security and other federal agencies for HA/DR operations, requirements must to be better articulated to help determine required resources and capacity. Additionally, better utilization of the FORGEN model would give a Governor or state agency better visibility and expectations for those units available in a particular state. Of interest is the National Guard Homeland Response Force (HRF) concept. With a force of nearly 600 guardsmen, each HRF will be able to provide immediate crisis response capability.²⁴ During Fiscal Year (FY) 2012, 10 of these HRFs will stand up, one for each of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regions. These HRF packages should be added to the FORGEN models to better show operational tempo and state or regional requirements.

The Reserve Budget

Costs are a significant factor when evaluating a unit status versus its readiness. The RC budget is far less than the AC, but should be restructured to potentially save costs via tiered readiness. There are several challenges associated with comparing the relative cost of the active and reserve component. From a strictly budgetary standpoint, the RC receives less money per unit than comparable to the AC. During FY 2010, the RC was authorized a baseline budget of \$41 billion to support 844,000 non-deployed reservists; the AC budget to support 1.4 million personnel was \$218 billion.²⁵ However, these numbers are misleading; deployed RC personnel are captured in the AC funding, and most RC personnel served less than 40 days versus serving an entire year. There is currently no metric in place to capture the true costs associated between an AC or RC unit; until the DoD does so, it is nearly impossible to determine the true cost differences between the two. Failure to assess and capture the costs will likely lead to operational and funding decisions to the Total Force not based on a value model, but potentially on biases and assumptions, most of which do not favor the RC.²⁶ For example, the Army plans to spend billions of dollars through 2017 to transform both its reserve components into operational forces. However, no assessment has been made concerning the requirements beyond 2014, and no analysis of the desired levels of readiness or capability have been performed. The failure to establish this critical framework does not allow the DoD to accurately capture costs associated with the true capabilities impacted by increased or decreased funding.²⁷ The 2008 Commission on the National Guard and Reserve specifically found that increased transparency of RC funding, equipment procurement, and plans for future support to operational requirements was needed to better support the Total Force.²⁸ Although specific operational costs are difficult

to capture, data is available to support personnel funding, which would help to better understand a portion of expenditures.

Specific costs for individuals can be measured to gain an understanding of reserve funding. For example, if an AC soldier under the current FORGEN model spends two years in a dwell period, it results in an individual cost of approximately \$140K per year. These costs account for billeting, infrastructure support, training, and other shared costs. A reserve soldier spending four years in a non-deployed or dwell status costs \$47K per year. These figures clearly identify that an RC individual is approximately one third the cost of an AC individual.

Additionally, using the same deployed to dwell ratio numbers, an AC would be deployed for 5 years of a 15 year period, averaging \$143K per year for each year. His reserve counterpart, deployed for 3 years total in the same period, would cost an overall average of \$68K per year, a savings of over half compared to the AC.²⁹ These savings are not just for individual personnel, but would also translate to units. When other factors such as medical, retirement and other benefits are calculated, reserve brigade combat teams end up being nearly 75 percent cheaper than their AC counterparts during peacetime.³⁰ These savings are only gained when RC units remain in a drilling status; when mobilized or deployed, reserve units cost approximately the same as active units. Based on this assessment, the RC appears to be an excellent value for the money. However, these costs have only been captured to support a non-deployed unit or individual, fail to represent actual support to contingency operations, and do not accurately identify the capabilities provided in relation to the costs.

Data suggests that reserve units are cheaper, but if they are not going to be used with regular frequency, their cost savings are not significantly helping the DoD. In order to support similar requirements but remain within the established deployment/dwell time frame, more RC

units are theoretically needed. For example, to support a standard requirement for a six-year period, three active duty units would be utilized. To support the same requirement, nine reserve units would be needed. Although potentially still a savings, utilizing reserve units to support this model increases their total costs to 84 percent of the AC.³¹ These costs do not capture the additional equipment and resources required to support the other reserve units during dwell and training periods. The potential costs savings in utilizing the RC is directly proportional to how much they are used; if a reserve unit exceeds its deploy to dwell ratio, it is cheaper than an AC unit, but it is costly because it is not fulfilling a critical requirement.³² An AC unit can be called upon at any time during its reset period, or any time after it becomes “available” and could deploy on short notice. A reserve unit will require a period of pre-deployment training unless it drills in excess of the normal number of drills per year to improve readiness. Therefore, if a RC unit remains in an operational status and prepared to deploy, it is less expensive than an AC unit to maintain, but is potentially not the best use of resources. To save costs, a paradigm shift should occur in the RC; the number of drill days and annual training (AT) periods should be reduced for a unit not scheduled to deploy on the FORGEN model.

A comparison of costs per drill and AT periods will help capture average costs and associated fiscal challenges. If drills are cut to support a strategic level of readiness versus the current model, significant personnel costs could be saved. Drilling requirements are identified in Section 10147, Title 10 of the US Code; it states that members of the Ready Reserve will participated in at least 48 scheduled drills and not less than 14 days but no more than 30 days of active duty annual training per year.³³ For this comparison, an assumption was made to use E-5/over four years of service as an average across the RC. The drill pay for four drills for this individual is \$326.44.³⁴ Drilling the minimum of 48 drills per year for each of the 844,000

drilling reservists results in an average cost of \$3900 per individual, for a total of over \$3.3 billion per year in individual compensation. In addition to the 48 drills per year, an individual will serve on average 15 days during an annual training period. Using the same E-5 average, this cost is \$1224 per AT period, for a total of over \$1 billion for the entire RC. These numbers total over \$4 billion for pay alone to support mandated Title 10 requirements and do not include housing or other allowances earned during an AT period. Additionally, these numbers do not include the pay for those mobilized or deployed, or other bonuses or incentives.

There is a potential for significant savings if drills are reduced for a strategic level unit (see Figure 2). If a unit was not on the FORGEN model to deploy in the near future, it could potentially reduce its overall readiness and training requirements as a strategic reserve. Specific requirements would need to be addressed, but if a strategic unit only needed half as much time as an operational unit, there could be significant savings across all functional areas.

# of Drills	48	36	24	12
Basic Pay	3917.28	2937.96	1958.64	973.32
+ 7 Day AT	612.08	612.08	612.08	612.08
Total	4529.36	3550.04	2570.72	1585.40

# of Drills	48	36	24	12
Basic Pay	3917.28	2937.96	1958.64	973.32
+ 14 Day AT	1224.15	1224.15	1224.15	1224.15
Total	5141.43	4162.11	3182.79	2197.47

Figure 2. Drill/AT pay per individual

A reduction of 50% in drill and AT periods across the RC would result in over a \$2 billion savings per year. Even if drills and AT periods were only reduced by 25%, over a billion dollars would be saved in personnel costs across the RC. This does not account for additional costs

savings in training, resources needed, facilities, and other costs that could be reduced by training the RC less frequency. Clearly a unit preparing to deploy would be considered operational and be resourced accordingly; those not scheduled on the FORGEN model should be considered strategic, and the resourcing for those should be commensurate. Additionally, Title 10 should be changed to account for strategic units and grant the services flexibility with mandated drills to save costs.

Training and Readiness

As a potential measure to save costs, the requirements for RC unit in a strategic level of readiness should change. The exact frequency of drills and duration of the AT period should be utilized to support basic or common skills, not intermediate or advanced MOS training. RC units in a strategic role should not have to satisfy the same annual training requirements as an AC unit, or a RC unit in an operational role. Based on individual service directed annual requirements, it is problematic under the current system for units to conduct all mandated common skills training and MOS training in a year. Requirements for each service RC need to be reviewed and it is recommended that some of them become semi-annual, or reduced in frequency. The exact amount of training for a strategic or non-FORGEN unit would need to be evaluated, but an assumption is that training time and resources could be reduced by as much as 50% in a non-FORGEN unit.

Training for a strategic unit would need to be assessed, and there is some risk with downgrading units to lower levels of readiness. If a unit was not on the FORGEN model, a unit participant could go several years at the reduced level of training and might not be prepared to complete certain tasks. Based on the current model, most services require between 9 and 11 days per year to complete mandated service annual training requirements; additional training time is

then utilized for MOS or unit skill or functional training.³⁵ To meet the requirements of an operational reserve, most units need more training time; to approach active duty standards either additional drill periods or some form of pre-deployment training is required.³⁶ By adopting a regional training center model, the Army Reserve has recently streamlined post mobilization training for operational units to approximately 35 days; training time required prior to deployment under the old system was between 70 and 80 days.³⁷ A strategic unit would only train to mastery in basic skills; advanced skills and MOS specific requirements would be re-trained during a post mobilization period.

There are risks associated with tiered readiness in the RC. First, longer and/or additional predeployment training would be required for a strategic unit if mobilized in support of a contingency. Prior to 2001, a RAND study showed that a reserve unit supporting a conventional requirement would need a minimum of 42 days of post mobilization training prior to deployment. To meet current operational needs, a similar unit would likely need between 60 to 90 days.³⁸ Theater OPLANs would need to be adjusted to account for additional time required to prepare and deploy strategic units, and a strategic level unit would potentially have less available time in theater if additional training was needed. Although these risks are potentially significant, the DoD must make some difficult decisions regarding readiness for the Total Force.

Predeployment training is only part of the problem; the RC must look to maximize all available training time.

The services must be more efficient when training the RC. The use of distance learning and the web to meet requirements could save significant costs. The use of distance learning and web based training could be used as non-paid drills; they would in effect then count as drills towards retirement but would save the DoD in personnel costs. Efficiencies with internet

delivered training would help save training time and reducing the infrastructure related costs for the RC. Additionally, those units that have a “direct output” when training, such as strategic mobility or logistics, should be addressed differently when compared to those units without such a benefit to the Total Force.³⁹

Specific Guard responsibilities to their respective states put them in a different category. However, not all Title 32 units need to be at an operational level of readiness. A review of the specific skills needed, identification of the military capacity required per state, and different levels of readiness need to be determined per state. An assessment of future demand based on historical trends and existing HA/DR plans will help to determine need. Title 32 units should focus on essential tasks to support HA/DR, but potentially not their assigned unit Mission Essential Task List (METL) unless designated for future deployment on the FORGEN model. The HRF concept to support HA/DR should be assessed and expanded. The exact levels of readiness needed, and the number and type of drills must be identified and solidified to better capture resource requirements.

Equipment and Resources

Personnel and training represent two key aspects of the RC costs; a third is equipment. There are significant equipment shortfalls across the RC; estimates to provide units funding for their Table of Organization (T/O) shortfalls are in excess of \$54 billion.⁴⁰ Not included in this cost are those needed to satisfy capabilities, shortfalls, or parity mismatch with the AC due to modernization disparities, which is approximately \$11 billion.⁴¹ The Army Reserve projects that nearly 35 percent of its equipment will be considered obsolete over the next 6 years; aircraft in the Air National Guard inventory average 29 years old, and nearly 80 percent of critical aircraft will near the end of their service life within 7 years.⁴² If all RC units are operational, it is far too

expensive to maintain full equipment readiness that will likely not be utilized. If not scheduled to deploy, Strategic level units can potentially train with older or outdated equipment to help save costs. Some equipment shortfalls in the RC are considered “Dual Use” equipment for HA/DR, to include vehicles, water purification systems, and related items. The National Guard was fielded at 77 percent of this equipment in 2010, and only 66 percent of the equipment was ready for use towards contingency missions.⁴³ This equipment should be a priority for procurement for RC units based on a state’s assessment of Title 32 requirements.

Significant money has been spent to give the reserves the resources needed to fight current conflicts. The DoD has spent \$37 billion on ANG equipment over the last six years.⁴⁴ Since 2001, procurement for the RC has increased by over 150 percent.⁴⁵ Although the US has spent significant money on RC equipment, it should not continue to keep all of the RC at an operational level due to the significant costs involved. As the requirements change, so should the amount and type of equipment fielded. A strategic unit should receive less equipment and resources than an operational unit based on the likelihood or potential for deployment, or will have to capture best practices and tailor training with older equipment.

The concept of a training allowance (TA) for home station use should be explored across the RC. A TA represents a portion of total required unit equipment; the portion is usually less than 50%, and is only intended for training purposes. An assessment of the specific end items per unit should be conducted. This equipment could be shared across multiple units to help reduce costs. One option would be to pool the equipment in regional storage facilities located close to training bases and stations. This would allow units to draw equipment, train with it as needed, and return it back into the pool. The US cannot afford to equip the entire RC at

operational levels; costs alone lead the DoD to utilize the RC as a strategic reserve and implement new and innovative ways to leverage critical resources.

Summary and Recommendations

The United States cannot afford to maintain a fully capable operational reserve. Throughout this study, several recommendations have been presented. Specific recommendations for to revise the RC include:

1. A tiered system of readiness tied to the FORGEN model provides a tool to better manage the resources of the Total Force.
2. As opportunities arise, “First Choice” employment considerations should be made for appropriate RC units.
3. The reduction of drill days and ATs should occur for those units not on the FORGEN model; a change to Title 10 should be explored to support this FORGEN adjustment to move a unit from operational to strategic status.
4. A review of training requirements for the RC needs to be conducted; annual training requirements and basic/common skills are the critical tasks that a strategic unit should train to accomplish.
5. HA/DR missions for Title 32 units should be assessed and resourced based on required capacity.
6. Creative solutions to equipment problems need to be explored, to include priority sourcing of dual use equipment and the establishment of training allowances.

The above recommendations are a step towards restructuring the operational and strategic RC in order to adapt to current and expected future constraints. Predictive employment of the RC is a necessity for future funding and employment decisions. There are risks associated

with decreasing the readiness of units not designated on the FORGEN model; in the expected times of budget decreases, the DoD should better assess threats and tier readiness to support expected challenges.



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Notes

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³ Department of Defense, *Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component* (Washington, DC: Office of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 5 April 2011), 15.

⁴ William M. Donnelly, "The Best Army that Can Be Put in the Field in the Circumstances: The U.S. Army, July 1951-July 1953," *Journal of Military History* 71, no. 3 (July 2007), 847.

⁵ Department of Defense, *Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force* (Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, October 2008), 7.

⁶ Nagl, *An Indispensable Force*, 8.

⁷ Ibid, 22.

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- ²⁹ United States House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations. "National Guard and Reserve Fiscal Year 2012 Budget." Subcommittee On the Department of Defense, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, ii.
- ³⁰ Barbara A. Bicksler and John D. Winkler, ed. *The New Guard and Reserve* (San Ramon, CA: Falcon Books, 2008), 181.
- ³¹ Ibid, 182.
- ³² Ibid, 184.
- ³³ Taz Olson, "Simply Not Enough Time," *Marine Corps Gazette*, October 2009, 54. It is difficult to capture the exact grade and years in service for the personnel in a unit for pay purposes.
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- ⁴³ Ibid, 26.
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